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DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN AVIATION LITIGATION
JAMES B. SALES*
I. DISCOVERY IN GENERAL
T HE DISCOVERY problems in aviation litigation necessarily
involve discussion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
since the vast majority of aviation litigation originates in the fed-
eral courts. As a consequence, the procedural aspects of discovery
are, in large measure, controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Many states have adopted, however, or are contem-
plating adoption of, rules patterned after the federal discovery
rules. This article will focus on discovery in general, with particu-
lar reference to aircraft cases on questions of privileged material
and relevancy under general discovery procedures and will review
the scope and application of the particular discovery techniques of
interrogatories, production, including governmental documents and
depositions, including depositions of FAA investigators.
Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure articulates
the standards governing discovery generally.! Rule 26(b) provides
for discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action. . . ." Moreover,
the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) is not limited by a re-
quirement of admissibility.2
Because of the volume and nature of reports, documents and
memoranda generated in the investigation of an aircraft accident,
the enumerated areas of limitations to discovery are particularly
significant in aviation litigation. These are the areas of "Privilege,"
* B.S., LL.B., The University of Texas at Austin, Attorney at Law, Houston,
Texas; Member of Texas Bar.
IFED. R. CIv. P. 26(b).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides, in part: "It is not grounds for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence."
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"Relevancy" and "Work Product of Attorneys." Although certain
privileges are recognized, such as attorney-client, the privilege is
particularly important in the arena of discovery of military and
government reports. Because of the complex and important nature
of discovery of these reports in litigation involving military air-
craft, the matter of privilege will be discussed in depth in connec-
tion with discovery of military accident reports. It is important to
emphasize that a claim of privilege must be formally made by the
party possessing the privilege and must be accompanied by ade-
quate validation.8
Rule 26(b) (1) also requires that the matter discovered be rele-
vant. An area of conflict developed early between the concept of
"relevancy" and "work product of the lawyer." In the landmark
case of Hickman v. Taylor," the Supreme Court indicated that an
attorney is judicially foreclosed from concealment of relevant facts
on the basis that the material sought to be discovered was com-
piled in preparation for trial.
Relevancy, of necessity, is circumscribed by reasonable limita-
tions. A party may be compelled to disgorge information reason-
ably expected to be available as matter of record or personal
knowledge of his officers and agents Analysis or evaluation of
information, however, is not encompassed within the ambit of dis-
covery.'
The policy of discovery is also designed to formulate the issues
involved in litigation. Therefore, relevancy within the meaning of
Rule 26(b) includes discovery of the specific nature of the adverse
party's claims and allegations."
In the landmark decision on the status of work product, Hick-
man v. Taylor,8 the Supreme Court rejected the claim of privilege
against disclosure of trial preparation material. The Court declared
that the attorney-client privilege did not extend to information that
an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in
3345 U.S. 1 (1953).
4329 U.S. 495 (1947).
'McElroy v. United Air Lines, 21 F.R.D. 100 (W.D. Mo. 1957); Dusek v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
6Id.
7Id.
8 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See also Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1968).
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anticipation of litigation. The Court declined to order production,
however, because of the failure of the plaintiff to establish a neces-
sity for discovery.
The 1970 revision of the Rules does not abrogate the Hickman"
requirement that justification must be established for incursions
into the privacy of an attorney's trial preparation file. The new
Rule 26(b) (3) specifically provides for discovery of trial prepa-
ration material, but imposes the requirement that the party seeking
discovery show a substantial need of the materials by other means.
Under Rule 26(b) (3), the trial preparation materials of an at-
torney are not given special status, except to the extent that
the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against
discovery of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party.
Therefore, with the "mental impression and legal theory"
and "expert witnesses" limitation, Rule 26 (b) allows "discovery of
documents and tangible things . . . prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative. . . ." Again, it should be emphasized that
discovery is significantly dependent upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need and is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means."°
II. INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatories under Rule 33 are limited to parties. Formerly,
interrogatories could be served only on adverse parties, but the
1970 amendments allow service of written interrogatories on any
other party to the litigation.
In certain instances, however, interrogatories may be a totally
unsatisfactory method for procuring discovery. This was recog-
nized by the court in Branyon v. KLM," which involved a wrong-
ful death action originating from a Dutch airliner crash in India.
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had shown good
cause to dispense with written interrogatories, and granted a rare
order for letters rogatory to the Indian High Court to appoint a
9329 U.S. 495 (1947).
1"FED. R. COv. P. 26(b)(3).
11 13 F.R.D. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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commissioner to take oral depositions of witnesses and compel the
production of required documents. The court recognized the inade-
quacy of written interrogatories for examining witnesses concern-
ing basic facts and causes of a major airplane disaster.
Written interrogatories to parties are an appropriate and effective
vehicle for obtaining with greater specificity the contentions and
claims of an adversary."2 One of the purposes of discovery is to
eliminate surprises and advance the stage at which disclosure can
be compelled. But the courts have evidenced a rather flexible ap-
proach in permitting parties to enlarge on specific contentions be-
cause aircraft crash cases are a unique and complex type of litiga-
tion. As an example, the district court in McElroy v. United Air
Lines," sustained a motion to compel plaintiff to enumerate all
alleged negligent acts but indicated that the plaintiff would not
necessarily be relegated to these contentions at trial if continuing
investigation disclosed new facts.
In Lunn v. United Aircraft Corporation," the defendant moved
for further and more specific answers to certain interrogatories that
asked whether plaintiff contended defendant had violated a Civil
Air Regulation. The plaintiff answered affirmatively, but stated he
did not know the particular regulation violated. The court held
that plaintiff was obligated to notify the defendant as soon as it
ascertained the regulation and the alleged violation relied upon.
The 1970 addition of subdivision (3) to Rule 26 imposes a
duty on the answering party to supplement responses to interroga-
tories. In addition Rule 26(e) requires a party by supplemental
answers to identify any persons possessing knowledge of any dis-
coverable matter; to identify persons expected to be called as expert
witnesses at the trial; and the substance of the expected subject
matter of the expert's testimony. Further, Rule 26(e) provides a
duty to seasonably amend answers to interrogatories when a party
discovers that the answers were incorrect when given or when sub-
sequently developed information would indicate that the former
answer, although correct when given, would constitute a knowing
concealment. These additions were designed to resolve myriad
12Merrill v. United Air Lines, 151 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); McElroy
v. United Air Lines, 21 F.R.D. 100 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
1821 F.R.D. 100 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
1425 F.R.D. 186 (D. Del. 1960).
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disparate holdings among the courts on the continuing duty to
answer." The continuing obligation to supplement responses to
interrogatories is particularly appropriate in complex aviation liti-
gation. Volumes of data coupled with periodic utilization of ex-
perts provide a need for updating responses to interrogatories.
The courts have consistently declared that opinion testimony is
discoverable through the vehicle of interrogatories. Thus interroga-
tories are not objectionable merely because they seek to obtain the
opinions and conclusions of experts regularly employed by the air-
lines." In Anderson v. United Air Lines,' plaintiff's interrogatories
sought expert opinions on malfunctioning of the fire warning and
extinguishing system, settings of certain controls, the source of cer-
tain sooting and the type of hydrocarbon comprising the soot. The
district court specifically noted that a party was obligated to re-
spond to interrogatories calling for opinions or conclusions within
the knowledge and possession of the party. The plaintiffs also
requested information on the observations made by a United Air
Lines captain flying over the crash site and the effect of these
observations on the crew of the aircraft. The defendant was com-
pelled to respond since the observations were within the knowledge
of United Air Lines personnel and therefore the information was
reasonably ascertainable.
Discovery of opinions of experts poses a special problem. It is
essential to distinguish the three situations that arise in connection
with experts utilized in litigation. The courts have consistently al-
lowed discovery of experts in the regular employ of the adverse
party." An expert will not be compelled, however, to offer opinions
and conclusions not already formulated at the time of discovery.
The second class of experts are those not regularly employed by
a party but who are selected and employed only for the purpose of
testifying at trial. Rule 26(b) (4) (A)( 1 ) specifically provides that
through interrogatories a party may require any other party to
identify each person whom the party expects to call as an expert
5 E.g., Gorsha v. Commercial Transp. Corp., 38 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. La. 1965);
Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 10 F.R. Ser. 2d 33.342 (D. Md.
1967); Contra, Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186 (D. Del. 1960).
10 Kendall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
1749 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"' Kendall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Moran
v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
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witness at the trial and to state the subject matter on which the
expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions
of the expert and a summary of the grounds for each opinion." In
the absence of extreme circumstances, the permissible scope of dis-
covery of these experts is stringently restricted.
The third class of expert is one specially retained for purposes
of trial preparation but not expected to testify."° Under Rule
26(b) (4) (B) a party may not discover facts known or opinions
held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and
who is not expected to be called as a witness at the trial except
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means. In the absence of
this showing, discovery of facts and opinions of consulting experts
is precluded. Moreover, the consulting expert must be retained or
specially consulted, and informal consultation is not discoverable
under the circumstances.
These new rules, which provide that the party seeking discovery
pay the expert a reasonable fee, indicate an attempt to resolve
many earlier conflicting decisions. For example, in the case of
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp.,"' the district court
denied discovery of an expert witness based on the unfairness of
allowing the party seeking discovery to obtain opinion testimony
without payment of a reasonable fee to the expert. In Petroleum
Helicopters, Inc. v. Republic Aviation Corp.," an action arising
from an aircraft crash, the court would not allow the defendant to
compel the plaintiff's expert witness to give his opinion based on his
examination of the mechanical part alleged to have caused the
accident because the defendant possessed the capacity to conduct
an independent examination with its own expert witness. Although
the amended rule now limits the extent of discovery of experts, a
party may be required to disgorge the essential opinion and factual
basis undergirding the opinions of experts.
19FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b) (4) (A) (1). E.g., Falk v. United States, 53 F.R.D.
113 (D. Conn. 1971).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (B).
22 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
228 Av. Cas. 17, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
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III. PRODUCTION
Rule 34, entitled Production of Documents and Things and
Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes, has been
completely changed by the 1970 amendments. The recent modifi-
cations were designed to accomplish four major purposes: (i) to
eliminate the requirement of "good cause"; (ii) to make the rule
operate extra-judicially; (iii) to include not only inspecting and
photographing, but also testing and sampling of tangible things;
and (iv) to clarify that an independent action for analogous dis-
covery against persons who are not parties is not precluded by this
rule. The requirement of good cause was made unnecessary by
the additions of Rule 26(b) relating to trial preparation materials
and to experts retained or consulted by the parties. The only limi-
tations on production are incorporated in Rule 26 (b) (3). If pro-
duction of trial preparation material is sought, the party must show
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means." In connection with
production of reports of experts, no production is authorized with
respect to experts who will testify at trial other than through inter-
rogatories and with respect to experts who are specially retained
for preparation but not to testify, the party must show exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable to obtain facts or
opinions by other means. The revised rule continues to apply only
to parties. As an example, Rule 34 could not be employed to au-
thorize the inspection of the land of a nonparty where an aircraft
has crashed or production of reports in the custody and possession
of third parties not involved in the litigation.
The scope of Rule 34 is the same as that of Rule 26(b). The
extent of production allowed under Rule 34 is circumscribed by
the same requirements of relevancy, nonprivileged matters and the
attorney's work product.
IV. MILITARY REPORTS
Production is a peculiarly important discovery vehicle in litiga-
tion involving crashes of military aircraft. When a military craft
"Schuyler v. United Airlines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (W.D. Pa. 1950). But see
Honeywell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
1972]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
is involved in a crash, an official investigation is vigorously pur-
sued. When an Air Force aircraft crashes there will generally be
an investigation by a Collateral Board as well as an Air Force
Aircraft Investigation Board. Even the NTSB may conduct an in-
vestigation when a civilian aircraft is involved in a collision with a
military craft.
Litigation frequently is instituted under the Federal Tort Claims
Act arising from crash of military aircraft. Since the government
is a party to an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
official investigation performed by a department of the government
is discoverable. Rule 34 restricts production, however, to matters
"not privileged." Invariably, attempts to compel production of the
Aircraft Accident Investigation Report are met by refusal and a
claim of privilege.
Generally, the government will assert a claim of privilege against
disclosure of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Report on one of
two bases: (i) disclosure would jeopardize military secrets, or (ii)
disclosure would be inimical to the public welfare in determining
causes of accidents and increasing the efficiency of flight safety
programs through cooperation of private industry.
Inherent in an application of a claim of privilege are certain
basic and controlling principles. The requirements for successfully
invoking a claim of privilege were enumerated by the Supreme
Court in Reynolds v. United States.'M These general principles, suc-
cintly stated, are (i) the privilege belongs to the government and
must be asserted by it; (ii) the privilege can neither be invoked
nor waived by a private party; (iii) there must be a formal claim
lodged by the head of the department; and (iv) the head of the
department must determine the existence of and claim for a privi-
lege from a personal inspection of the report. Unless these condi-
tions exist, a claim of privilege against disclosure is unavailing. If
the United States is a party, production under Rule 34 is usually
invoked. In addition, production under Rule 34 is utilized in a suit
against a private corporation when the Aircraft Accident Investi-
gation Report has been furnished to private industry by the gov-
ernment for use in correcting or modifying equipment. When suit
is initiated against a private corporation, efforts to obtain the Air-
craft Accident Investigation Report are pursued by noticing the
24345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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oral deposition of an appropriate government official accompanied
by a subpoena duces tecum to produce the report.
Of necessity, the court must determine the validity of the as-
serted privilege. For example, in Cresmer v. United States,' the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The deceased was on the ground when a government
airplane crashed. The plaintiff moved for an order directing the
United States to produce for inspection and copying the report
prepared by the Navy Board of Investigation. The district court
granted the motion based on the failure of the United States to
establish that a military secret or threat to the national security was
involved."
The government successfully asserted the privilege against re-
vealing military secrets in Reynolds v. United States." That case
was instituted under the Federal Tort Claims Act by the widows of
three civilian employees who were aboard a United States Air
Force B-29 bomber that crashed in 1948 on a flight for the purpose
of testing secret electronics equipment. The United States refused
to answer the plaintiffs' interrogatories propounded under Rule
33 that requested a copy of any and all investigation reports of
the accident. The plaintiffs moved under Rule 34 for production of
the official investigation report prepared by the Air Force and the
statements of the surviving crew members taken in connection with
that investigation.
Since the United States was a party to an action under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, and the official investigation was performed
by a governmental agency, the plaintiffs would ordinarily have
been entitled to production of the report, as well as statements of
witnesses taken for the purpose of the investigative report. Rule
34 provided for production only of matters "not privileged," how-
ever, so that the question for the court was whether the United
States could assert a valid claim of privilege. The Court articulated
the nature and requirements of this privilege and the role of the
25 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
21 Id. at 204: "In the absence of a showing of a war secret, or secret in respect
to munitions of war, or any secret appliance used by the armed forces, or any
threat to the National security, it would appear to be unseemly for the Govern-
ment to thwart the efforts of a plaintiff in a case such as this to learn as much
as possible concerning the cause of the disaster."
27345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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court in determining whether the privilege would be allowed as
follows: "'
The privilege belongs to the [g]overnment and must be asserted
by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is
not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privi-
lege lodged by the head of the department which has control over
the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.
The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without
forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.
In the trial court, the Air Force filed a "claim of privilege" and
indicated to the court that the aircraft was engaged in a highly
secret mission. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force by
affidavit affirmed that the material could not be furnished without
hampering national security, flying safety and development of the
secret equipment. The trial court then requested that the United
States produce the documents in question for an in-camera exami-
nation and determination of whether disclosure would violate the
government's privilege against disclosure of matters involving the
national security or public interest. With regard to this request, the
United States Supreme Court stated :29
On the record before the trial court it appeared that this acci-
dent occurred to a military plane that had gone aloft to test secret
electronic equipment. Certainly there was a reasonable danger that
the accident investigation report would contain references to the
secret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of the
mission.
Of course, even with this information before him, the trial
judge was in no position to decide that the report was privileged
until there had been a formal claim of privilege. Thus, it was en-
tirely proper to rule initially that petitioner had shown probable
cause for discovery of the documents. Thereafter, when the formal
claim of privilege was filed by the Secretary of the Air Force
under circumstances indicated a reasonable possibility that military
secrets were involved, there was certainly a sufficient showing of
privilege to cut off further demand for the documents on the show-
ing of necessity for its compulsion that had then been made.




mine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the
occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. When there is
a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be
lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot
overcome the claim of privilege if the Court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake.
It is reasonably clear from the decision that the report in
Reynolds would divulge sensitive military secrets. This foreclosed
the prerogative of the trial court to conduct an in-camera exami-
nation."
The Supreme Court in the Reynolds case stressed the necessity
of a formal claim of privilege by the United States. The importance
of the formal claim is indicated by United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States," in which an action was brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act because of a collision between an aircraft of the United
States Government and an aircraft owned by United Air Lines.
United Air Lines sought production from the United States of the
report of two investigations by the Air Force, plus statements and
exhibits from those two investigations. Because of the absence of a
formal claim of privilege by the United States, the district court
refused to consider the question of privilege and, instead, handled
the question based on the former Rule 34 requirement of "good
cause." Presumably, under the July 1, 1970, amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the government did not formal-
ly claim its privilege, the reports, statements and exhibits requested
by the litigant would be subject to discovery since Rule 34 no
longer requires "good cause." In addition, the Court emphasized
that because the government did not formally invoke a claim of
privilege, privilege was not involved in the determination to order
production of the reports.
Another change in Rule 34 is also noteworthy. That rule no
longer contains a direct reference to privileged material but in-
stead allows production of any designated documents within the
'The Cresmer case was decided prior to Reynolds and the general procedure
employed by the court in determining the validity of the privilege would os-
tensibly be contrary to the procedure postulated by the Supreme Court in Rey-
nolds. The nature of the privilege is important in determining the extent of judicial
scrutiny. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
31 186 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1960). See Danon v. United States, 8 Av. Cas.
18, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (army report excluded from production).
1972]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
scope of Rule 26(b). Since Rule 26(b) states in part, however,
that parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter which is
not privileged, the privilege asserted by the government under Rule
34 remains intact.
In many cases involving military aircraft, the manufacturers
and suppliers of the aircraft and its components are sued and dis-
covery of governmental investigative reports is sought. The govern-
mental claim of privilege in these cases is not based on protection
of military secrets, but rather that disclosure would contravene the
public welfare that encourages private industry to provide full and
frank evaluation and cooperation in accident investigation to foster
efficient flight safety programs.
In In re Zuckert,32 an Air Force navigator who survived an air-
craft accident brought a products liability suit against United Air-
craft Corporation because it manufactured some components of the
crashed aircraft. The plaintiff's request for a copy of the Aircraft
Accident Investigation Report of the Air Force was refused by the
Secretary of the Air Force; the plaintiff then sought to obtain the
report by way of oral deposition and subpoena of the Secretary of
the Air Force who moved to quash. The Secretary did not assert
a privilege, but, instead, referred to Air Force Regulation 62-14
that indicated the accident investigation report was a privileged
document. The court concluded from the legislative history of the
statute that Congress did not intend information like the Air Force
report to be withheld under the aegis of section 522 of Title 5.3
After the ruling, however, the Secretary filed a formal claim of
privilege, and the court promptly quashed the subpoena.
In Machin v. Zuckert,' the plaintiff appealed from the quashing
of its subpoena after the trial court granted the formal claim of privi-
lege by the Secretary of the Air Force. In a significant decision the
court of appeals judicially acknowledged the validity of this
qualified privilege as distinguished from the privilege against dis-
closure of military secrets. In adjudicating the scope of this privi-
lege, the court observed:'
3228 F.R.D. 29 (D.D.C. 1961).
335 U.S.C. 5 522 (1970).
- 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
Id. at 338.
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Insofar, therefore, as the subpoena sought to obtain testimony
of private parties who participated in the investigation, we agree
with the [d]istrict [clourt that such information in the hands of the
[g]overnment is privileged. The privilege extends to any conclu-
sions that might be based in any fashion on such privileged infor-
mation. Also, a recognized privilege attaches to any portions of
the report reflecting Air Force deliberations or recommendations
as to policies that should be pursued. [Citations omitted.]
The parties, in argument before us, have treated the investigative
report as a unit that should either be entirely disclosed or entirely
suppressed. From our review of the case, however, it appears to
us that certain portions of the report could be revealed without in
any way jeopardizing the future success of Air Force accident
investigations. We refer to the factual findings of Air Force me-
chanics who examined the wreckage. Their investigations and
reports would not be inhibited by knowledge that their conclu-
sions might be made available for use in future litigation, and
their findings may well be of utmost relevance to the litigation
now pending between appellant and United Aircraft. Moreover,
we have in the past suggested that information of this sort would
ordinarily be subject to subpoena for use in connection with liti-
gation to which it is relevant. [Citations omitted.] Since the reasons
given by the [g]overnment for holding the investigative report
privileged do not, on their face, apply to information of this sort,
we consider that, to this limited extent, the subpoena should have
been enforced.
Following the decision, however, the Secretary of the Air Force
attempted to limit the mechanics' reports to facts as distinguished
from opinions. The court of appeals in a supplemental opinion
stated: 8
If the mechanics expressed any 'opinions' or 'conclusions' as to
possible defects in the propellors or propellor governors that might
have been due to the negligence of United Aircraft, we do not
consider that such expressions would come within the privilege
enunciated in our opinion.
Under the decision, the Air Force mechanics' reports, including
opinions concerning defects in the propellors, were not privileged.
But if an in-camera examination of the reports revealed that the
opinions were predicated in measure on data and opinions received
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When a private party, such as a manufacturer of military air-
craft, is involved in litigation, the privilege involved in Machin
constitutes a viable protection for the integrity of military air
safety programs and related activities. Accordingly, the court in
Machin37 acknowledged that data supplied by representatives of
private industry and opinions based on the data was privileged and
nondiscoverable. This privilege extended to encompass final con-
clusions and policy recommendations of the Military Board. But
the court of appeals carefully delineated the limits of this particu-
lar privilege and held that facts and opinions of individual govern-
ment personnel are discoverable. The circumscribed ambit of this
privilege as announced in Machin8 meshes with the rationale sup-
porting the privilege. It protects the integrity of candid and frank
participation of private industry in military investigations.
This particular privilege was again considered in O'Keefe v.
Boeing Co.," which involved a suit against the manufacturer of a
bomber for wrongful death and injuries of members of the flight
crew that occurred in a crash of the aircraft. The Air Force had
provided Boeing Aircraft with the Aircraft Accident Investi-
gation Report, and the plaintiff then sought production from
Boeing. The Air Force intervened to oppose production of this
document. Upon a claim of privilege by the Secretary of the Air
Force, accompanied by an appropriate affidavit, the district court
divided the subject documents into two general classes:
(1) records of facts made in the course of the investigations
and contained in the statements of Air Force personnel, group
reports and 'formal reports' to which the claim of privilege is
directed; and, on the other hand, (2) opinions, speculations,
recommendations, and discussions of Air Force policy contained
in the same statements, reports, and 'formal reports'.
Based on this division, the court then concluded: "It seems
reasonable and appropriate that a privilege be sustained as to
papers in the class (2) and denied as to papers in the class (1)."
The district court purported to follow the Machin rationale in
distinguishing between "facts" and "conclusions or opinions." The
37 Id.
"Id. The public policy of encouraging frank evaluations of causes of acci-
dents is pertinent. Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968).
39 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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court stated, however, that the privilege was waived by the Air
Force when it voluntarily released the documents to Boeing. A
determination that the privilege had been waived ostensibly fore-
closed further inquiry. The court, however, then stated:
Under the circumstances here present, it does not seem fair
that an executive privilege should be available against discovery
and inspection of the papers in the hands of Boeing so far as they
deal with facts. Any privilege as to that part of the papers appears
to have been waived. (The same balancing of interests as between
considerations of fairness and of the public interest leads to a dif-
ferent conclusion as to waiver of privilege respecting opinions,
conclusions, etc.; there is not the same necessity for plaintiffs to
secure these parts of the papers and at the same time the public
interest in sustaining the privilege is greater.)
It is incongruous to split a privilege into "fact" and "opinion"
for purposes of ruling whether a privilege has been waived since
the focal issue is whether the report is discoverable. The only
legal proscription against production is the privileged status of the
document based on a policy to encourage private industry to con-
tinue full and open cooperation with the military in improving
flight safety. If providing circulation of the report beyond govern-
ment circles constitutes a waiver of the privilege, then the entire
report is discoverable. It is unimportant for purposes of the policy
supporting the privilege whether facts or conclusions are disgorged
since factual data probably represents equally incriminating ma-
terial against the interests of private industry as the final opinion
and conclusions of the Board.
Privilege was again reviewed extensively in McFadden v. Avco
Corp." This action was brought for death resulting from a heli-
copter crash. The defendant, rather than the plaintiff, filed a mo-
tion to compel answers from certain military members of an Army
investigation board, and to produce certain documents that con-
sisted of statements made by two Army personnel in connection
with the helicopter crash. The Army custodian of records was in-
structed by the Secretary of the Army not to produce these state-
ments because the Secretary felt that the production would have
an adverse effect on the Army's vigorous and vital Aircraft Safety
4Id. at 335.
11 278 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
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Program. With respect to the persons who made the statements
sought by the defendant, the court found that an offer by the Army
to produce the witnesses for oral depositions was insufficient. The
district court observed:'
The Army is willing to make those same persons available for
depositions. The litigants should have the benefit of the informa-
tion available when it was fresh and which only a statement con-
temporaneous with the accident can provide. The courts and the
litigants are entitled to accurate information in their search for
truth, just as the Army is, and there seems little reason for denying
them access to it, when, as here, the chance of interfering with
the Army's future investigations is slight.
Moreover, it was further determined that the statements involved
were not the subject of a valid privilege, since representatives of
the private industry were not involved as in Machin. The court
implied that the order of the Secretary of the Army to the custodian
to withhold the statements was not a lawful order since no privi-
lege existed. The court then ordered production of documents that
included conclusions as well as facts by military or government
personnel. The court stated :4
Mr. Gaines' Motion to Quash, etc. is denied and the documents
called for by the subpoena are ordered produced, including con-
clusions of any witness or person who is asked an opinion predi-
cated on facts of the investigation provided such witness or other
persons, including a Board member, is qualified as an expert with
reference to the particular conclusions requested. This order ap-
plies only to military or U.S. Government personnel.
In Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co.," the plaintiff filed a motion
under Rule 34 against the United States for production of the
Aircraft Accident Investigation Report. The district court, pur-
portedly following Machin, ordered production of all factual por-
tions of the investigative report prepared by government personnel
but suppressed discovery of those portions containing opinions and
conclusions. This particular privilege was not designed, however,
42d. at 60.
43 Id.
" 10 Avi. Cas. 17,507 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). The court specifically noted that no
claim of military secrets was urged.
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to protect personnel employed by the government who participate
in the investigative process.
The privilege against disclosure of reports from private agencies
is recognized and is accorded the status of a privilege. When the
United States is the only party, disclosure of the report would do
no violence to the policy and rationale of this privilege. The pur-
pose is to protect confidentiality of data and reports from private
industry relating to the causative factors of an accident. When the
report is prepared by members of a governmental agency, the basis
for protection against disclosure is absent. On the other hand, when
a party other than the United States Government is involved, the
privilege is viable. All information supplied by private industry
must be excluded and any opinions based on information supplied
by representatives of private industry would likewise be excluded
along with final conclusions and policy recommendations of the
Board. The only reason that sustains the action of the govern-
ment in refusing production is the privileged nature of the report.
When the policy that sired the privilege is adopted and the con-
fidentiality of the report of private industry is judicially protected,
no valid basis exists for further judicial suppression of production.
In addition, the parties are afforded an opportunity to seek dis-
covery through injunctive process.' In Soucie v. David,' the court
determined that the Freedom of Information Act was designed to
broaden rather than restrict disclosure of governmental reports
and that a suit for injunctive relief was a proper vehicle to compel
disclosure. It is certainly apparent there is an emerging trend to
force disclosure. Injunctive relief to obtain military reports, par-
ticularly when the government is not a party to litigation, may be
a versatile weapon in the arsenal of discovery.
V. NTSB REPORTS
The investigative function of aircraft disasters, not involving
military aircraft accidents, is now carried out by the National
' See 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1970). But see Farrell v. Ignatius, 283 F. Supp. 58
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (recognizing injunction action to enforce disclosure of infor-
mation).
46 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court noted at p. 1076: "The chief
purpose of the new act was to increase public access to governmental records
by substituting limited categories of privileged material for these discretionary
standards, and providing an effective judicial remedy." See also Getman v.
N.L.R.B., 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Transportation Safety Board. Previously these functions were han-
dled by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The report of both the NTSB
and the CAB are inadmissable into evidence since they constitute
hearsay." Section 1441 (e) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
provides in part:
No part of any report or reports of .. .the Civil Aeronautics
Board relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall
be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages
growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.
In addition the proscription is applicable to individuals partici-
pating in the investigation. Section 431.5(a) of the Federal Regu-
lations provides:'
Testimony of employees and former employees. Employees may
serve as witnesses for the purpose of testifying to the facts ob-
served by them in the course of accident investigations in those
suits or actions for damages arising out of aircraft accidents in
which an appropriate showing has been made that the facts desired
to be adduced are not reasonably available to the party seeking
such evidence by any other method, including the use of discovery
procedures against the opposing party. Employees and former
employees shall testify only as to facts actually observed by them
in the course of accident investigations and shall respectfully de-
cline to give opinion evidence as expert witnesses, their evaluations
and conclusions, or testify with respect to recommendations result-
ing from accident investigations on the grounds that [section]
701 (e) and this part prohibit their giving such testimony. Litigants
are expected to obtain their expert witnesses from other sources.
The intent of the prohibitions of section 1441 (e) and section
431.5 is to preserve the functions of court and jury uninfluenced
by the findings of the Board or its investigators. The ultimate con-
clusion and opinion of probable cause of an accident by the NTSB
represents a composite of all data and opinions gleaned from the
investigation. The ultimate conclusion would directly affect the
ultimate issues involved in civil litigation arising from the accident
without the parties being afforded an opportunity of testing the
conclusions by a full and fair cross-examination.
4 Universal Airlines v. Eastern Airlines, 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The
court made the observation that "It is quite clear that 5 701(e) reveals the in-
tention to preserve the functions of court and jury uninfluenced by the findings
of the Board of Investigators." 188 F.2d at 1000.
48 14 C.F.R. § 431.5(e) (1970).
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Unfortunately, the NTSB investigation provides crucial data for
purposes of a tort suit arising from the accident. Successful dis-
covery frequently depends on obtaining deposition testimony from
investigators responsible for examining, investigating and inter-
preting data from the wreckage following an accident. In numerous
instances, the predicate for obtaining independent expert opinions
on reconstruction of the causes of aircraft mishaps is exclusively
dependent on data and opinions supplied by FAA investigators.
Though the statute on its face appears to prohibit use of any
reports or conclusion of CAB or the present NTSB investigations,
the courts have given a very restrictive interpretation to the statute.
Universal Airline v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.," involved a midair col-
lision of two passenger aircrafts. The court of appeals ordered the
personal appearance of a CAB investigator to testify to his obser-
vations in connection with investigation of the accident. The court
stated that it was incumbent on the Board to make the investigators'
testimony available by deposition or in person, and if depositions
were not forthcoming, the court would order his personal attend-
ance at trial. This policy is now codified in the regulations."
Lobel v. American Airlines" further eroded the general prohi-
bition announced in section 1441 (e). The report of a CAB in-
vestigation of the wreckage of the aircraft was admitted into evi-
dence because the entire report was the investigator's observations
about the condition of the plane after the accident, and contained
no opinions or conclusions about possible causes of the accident or
defendant's negligence. The Second Circuit significantly restricted
the limitations of section 1441 (e) to opinions and conclusions of
the Board.
The Second Circuit again considered the effect of section 1441
in Israel v. United States." In that case, the court approved the
admission by the trial court into evidence of part of the CAB
accident investigation report that contained an investigator's opin-
ion regarding the probable effect of the condition of the airfield on
an aircraft attempting to take off. The Second Circuit also approved
the admission of the testimony of an inspector concerning the results
49 Id.
-014 C.F.R. § 431.5 (1970).
51 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952).
52 247 F.2d 426, 429 n.2 (2d Cir. 1957).
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of an investigation of the surface condition of the airfield. The de-
fendant apparently waived any objection to this testimony because
of a concession during trial that the CAB report was competent,
and a later introduction of portions of the investigator's statement
relating to probable cause that had been deleted from the plaintiff's
exhibit.
Testimony of witnesses examined by the CAB in the course of
its investigation into an aircraft accident is unaffected by the man-
date of section 1441 (e). 3 Moreover, reports made by the employees
of an airline in the course of a CAB investigation are not gov-
erned by the provisions of section 1441 (e) .
More recent cases confirm the limited effect accorded by section
1441 (e). The case of Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,"5 involved
a wrongful death action by the plaintiffs against Eastern Airlines.
The Third Circuit concluded that the deposition testimony of two
members of the CAB structures committee concerning calculations
of an aeronautical engineer who worked under the chairman's
supervision was hearsay and constituted prejudicial error. Though
the case was reversed and remanded for new trial, however, the
case is significant for its implications with respect to what evidence
would be allowed in only slightly different circumstances. The
plaintiff proceeded on the theory of one or more acts of willful
misconduct on the part of the defendant to avoid the limitations
of the Warsaw Convention. The plaintiff attempted to establish its
theory through two expert witnesses who were permitted to give
conclusions and opinions regarding the behavioral conduct of the
pilot of the fatal flight based on certain crucial assumed facts
framed in hypothetical questions. These facts were placed into evi-
dence by the testimony of the two chairmen of the Operations and
Structures Committees of the CAB that investigated the crash.
These investigators testified regarding perimeters of angle and rate
of descent of the aircraft prior to the crash.
The Third Circuit found no error in the procedure that allowed
one of the two CAB men to refresh his memory from the report of
'3 Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Tansey v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C.
1949). Accord Aviation Enterprises Inc. v. Cline, 395 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. App.
1965) (report of pilot of crashed aircraft is not excluded by terms of 49 U.S.C.
S 1441(e)).
55 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
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the other and to testify to facts and figures upon which the plain-
tiff's experts later based conclusions. The testimony was read to
the jury from the oral depositions of the two CAB men. The court
noted that this policy was suggested in Universal Airline v. Eastern
Airlines.8
Moreover, the Third Circuit found that this testimony was not
barred by the prohibition of section 1441 (e). Instead the court
reversed and remanded because the calculations contained in the
deposition testimony of the CAB investigator were premised in
large measure on mathematical computations performed by an
aeronautical engineer working under the investigator's supervision.
Since the aeronautical engineer was compelled to make certain
sophisticated assumptions and choices relative to the physical facts
found at the crash scene before tabulation of final computations,
the testimony was based on hearsay. The court noted that the de-
fendant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the
engineer and to ascertain from him the basis of his computations.
It is reasonably clear, however, that if the investigator had per-
formed the computations, his testimony with respect to his compu-
tations that were later used by the plaintiff's experts as the basis
of their opinions and conclusions concerning pilot misconduct,
would have been permissible. The Third Circuit apparently defined
the prohibition of section 1441 (e) as limited to official Board and
investigator conclusions of probable cause.
Fidelity & Casualty Co." rejected the liberalized rule announced
in Berguido. The court amended its own prior ruling that would
have allowed discovery by deposition of conclusions and opinions
of a CAB investigator unrelated to probable cause of the crash."
In the very recent case of American Airlines, Inc. v. United
States,"' the Fifth Circuit approved the Berguido rule and expressly
so 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Accord Maxwell v. Fink, 264 Wis. 106, 58
N.W.2d 415 (1953); McCutcheon v. Larsen, 333 P.2d 1013 (Mont. 1959).
87227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964).
'ol d. at 949. "A more workable and better rule is entirely to exclude all
evaluation, opinion and conclusion evidence. This is the only practical way to
give adequate affect to and fulfill the purpose of the provisions of § 1441(e)."
Although the court comments that its decision is more in line with Berguido v.
Eastern Air Lines, 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963), it apparently is more restrictive
and accords controlling effect to the literal provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e)
(1970). Contra Falk v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 113 (D. Conn. 1971).
9 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
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rejected the limited Frank rule that separated fact from opinion.
That case arose as an action for the death of a passenger brought
against the airline that crashed on landing in Connecticut. With
regard to the plaintiff's claim against American Airlines, the trial
court allowed introduction into evidence of graphs and a readout
of the flight recorder obtained from the CAB report. The argu-
ment was urged that this data was prohibited by the mandate of
section 1441(e). The two exhibits consisted of a graph plotting
the indicated altitude of the flight, and a document explaining the
readout from the flight recorder of the aircraft. The opinion of the
Fifth Circuit initially characterized these exhibits as factual data
distinguishable from opinions and conclusions. The court candidly
acknowledged, however, that interpretative readout involved such
a sophisticated process that it really was opinion, and then stated:"0
American Airlines' position on the reach of section 1441(e)
seems thoroughly at variance with the prevailing interpretation of
the statute. As stated in Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. [Cita-
tion omitted.] 'the primary thrust of the provision is to exclude
CAB reports which express agency views as to the probable cause
of the accident'. Exhibits 58 and 89 are not the report of the
CAB and do not reflect the Board's evaluation of the data they
contain or the emphasis placed on that data in reaching a decision
on probable cause. To the contrary the exhibits merely display and
explain the data derived from the flight recorder foil itself, which
was admitted without objection.
Appellant vigorously stresses the opinion nature of the testi-
mony. However, Berguido established that qualified testimony
going beyond merely personal observations is admissible provided
such testimony does not presume to be official agency opinion.
Although purporting to follow Berguido, Fidelity & Casualty
Company of New York v. Frank [Citation omitted] distinguishes
between 'factual' testimony by investigations and evaluation, opin-
ion or conclusion evidence' that is objectionable. In the context
of this case it would perhaps be suitable to say that the attempt
to derive information about the altitude, speed, heading, and
vertical acceleration of Flight 383 was a factual inquiry. However,
a very sophisticated evaluation of the data had to be made. Be-
cause of the uncertainty which the Frank rule would introduce in
sorting fact from opinion, it would be better to exclude opinion
testimony only when it embraces the probable cause of the accident
or the negligence of the defendant.
60Id. at 196.
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The holding of the Fifth Circuit may extend beyond Berguido"
The Third Circuit opinion in Berguido modified that sentence in
the first paragraph quoted above by the Fifth Circuit, by subse-
quently stating: "Of necessity, the opinion testimony of the CAB's
investigators would also come within this rule.""2 Yet, if the ex-
hibits, which merely display and explain the data derived from the
flight recorder foil, are opinion testimony as the court seems to
admit, then the Fifth Circuit is further liberalizing the holding in
the Berguido case and allowing the opinion testimony of the CAB's
investigators.
The Fifth Circuit in American Airlines"' ostensibly limited
the applicability of section 1441 (e) to the conclusions of the Board.
Technically, this is consistent with the rationale of section 1441 (e)
since the Board's conclusion of probable cause represents a com-
posite conclusion gleaned from the myriad data and opinions of
numerous investigators. The conclusions of the Board are not
subject to a full and fair opportunity of cross-examination to test
the validity of the opinions provoked by the various investigative
data.
Under the rationale of American Airlines, Inc.," opinions and
conclusions of individual investigators are limited only to the ex-
tent that these opinions or conclusions are based on hearsay, or
that the investigator is not qualified to express an opinion. Argu-
ably, the parties are afforded on deposition a full and fair oppor-
tunity for a comprehensive cross-examination to test the opinions
of the investigator.
Frequently, the testimony of individual FAA investigators pro-
vids the critical data necessary to establish a claim or defense to a
claim that is not available through other sources. Under American
Airlines it is arguable that the witness will be compelled to
provide not only factual information but also to respond with
opinions and conclusions even though the opinion may involve
possible causes of the crash.
61317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
62 Id. at 632.
63418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Id.
"Id. See also Falk v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 113 (D. Conn. 1971) (section
1441(e) does not preclude opinion of an F.A.A. investigator on the cause of a
crash).
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If the policy underlying suppression of opinions of FAA investi-
gators relating to the causative factors of aircraft accidents is
properly premised on a desire to preserve the functions of the
courts and juries uninfluenced by findings of the Board, the oppor-
tunity of all parties to a full and fair cross-examination to test the
opinions and conclusions preserves inviolate this policy. It has
been suggested that this rule contravenes the clear purpose of the
FAA investigation and violates the functions and roles assigned to
this organization. But until the courts are willing to recognize
that the Board's sole function is to investigate accidents to prevent
similar occurrences and not to provide expert witnesses for the
benefit of private litigants, then opinions and conclusions of FAA
investigators may theoretically be available for use in litigation.
Clearly, an FAA investigator cannot be compelled to formulate
an opinion for purposes of discovery, but there appears no tech-
nical impediment to providing opinions already formulated under
the rationale suggested by recent cases.
VI. DEPOSITIONS
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
the taking of oral depositions. In aviation litigation oral depositions
are widely used as effective discovery tools and are perhaps the
only real means of probing in depth for the causative factors un-
derlying a major aircraft disaster.
Generally, an aircraft disaster produces multiple claims. Ac-
cordingly a frequent problem encountered in the early stages is a
determination of the extent to which deposition discovery is usable
in cases other than the case in which particular depositions were
taken. An attempt to utilize a deposition taken in separate suit
arising from the same accident generally provokes an objection
that the testimony is hearsay. The courts that have wrestled with
this problem have caused much confusion. In Rice v. United Air
Lines, Inc.," the airline objected to plaintiff's rather novel requests
for admission of the genuineness of answers to interrogatories and
testimony by oral depositions taken in another action arising from
the same accident. The district court overruled the objection and
held that no burden or prejudice would result to the defendant in
" 10 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
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answering these requests for admissions subject to the right to inter-
pose permissible objections at trial.
The traditional rule provides that depositions taken in a prior
action are inadmissible in the absence of an identity of issues and
parties." The liberal view on the other hand, requires only an
identity of issues with the adverse party possessing the same motive
of cross examination in the prior action."8 But in the absence of an
identity of issues and the same motive and interest in cross exami-
nation by an adverse party, the courts have generally denied use
of the depositions taken in a prior suit even under the liberal rule
requiring only identity of interests rather than identity of interests
and parties. Moreover, a mere showing that the depositions were
taken in an action arising from the same accident is insufficient to
establish identity of issues."" In Wolf v. United Air Lines,"0 the
decedent was fatally injured in a crash of an aircraft owned and
operated by the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion to permit
use of depositions taken in actions by other persons arising from
the same accident. The district court noted that many courts re-
quire identity of issues and parties with a right to a full cross-
examination by the adverse party. Even in the face of the liberal
rule requiring only an identity of issues with the adverse party
possessing the same motive in cross-examination, the depositions
were excluded. The court stated:1
The important distinguishing feature in this case is that United
Airlines and Douglas were both defendants of record in the actions
in which the depositions in question were taken, and furthermore
there was a cross-claim by United Airlines against Douglas in each
of the actions ....
Though many of the depositions were probably relevant to the
question of defendants' liability to the plaintiff in this action, under
the prevailing circumstances the interest and motive of United
Airlines in its direct and cross-examination of deponents may very
well not have been the same at that time as it is now in an action
in which Douglas is not a party.
"'Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Gumby, 99 Fed. 192 (2d Cir. 1900); United
States v. Aluminum Company of America, 1 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
as 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1388 (3d ed. 1940).
"
9 Wolf v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 8 Av. Cas. 17,726 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
0 12 F.R.D. 1 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
71Id. at 3.
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An exhaustive review of this problem was undertaken in First
National Bank v. National Airlines." There the plaintiffs filed a
motion to direct that all depositions taken in a prior cause of action
would be usable in the present suit. The cause of action was insti-
tuted against National Airlines and Douglas Aircraft Corporation
for the crash of an aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico. The plaintiffs
alleged negligence of National in intentionally flying in inclement
weather and of Douglas for a product defect. The prior suits in
which depositions were taken involved only National Airlines but
not Douglas. After reviewing the authorities that considered the
admissibility of depositions taken in prior actions, the court adopted
the liberal identity of interests rule rather than identity of parties
rule. But the court denied use of the depositions even under the
liberal rule because: (i) Douglas was not a party in the prior
action; (ii) Douglas as a party undoubtedly would want to depose
the witnesses whose depositions were previously taken; (iii) a num-
ber of depositions in the prior action were taken by attorneys for
National other than those representing National in the present ac-
tion; and (iv) an issue of negligence in connection with an alleged
wing defect not raised in the prior action would distort to some
extent National's motive in cross-examination of the witnesses.
One of the cases referred to by the court was Scotti v. National
Airlines." The plaintiff filed a motion to direct that all depositions
taken in a prior suit arising from the same accident would be usable
and admissible in the present suit. Relying on Rivera v. American
Export Lines, Inc., the district court granted the motion and speci-
fically noted:7"
The defendant in this action had the same motive to question or
cross question the deponents in the earlier actions as it would
have in the instant one. In view of the fact that there was another
defendant in the earlier cases, certain portions of the depositions
may be inapplicable; those portions should be eliminated.
It is rather obvious, in the context of aviation litigation within
the federal court system, that the more liberal view of admissibility
based on identity of interests and a comparable motive to cross
examine represents the prevailing trend. A close scrutiny of the
72 22 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
7. 15 F.R.D. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
74 Id. at 503.
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cases involving the issue of admissibility, however, quickly demon-
strates the proclivity of the courts to deny admissibility when con-
fronted with any disparity that tends to make suspect the quality of
the motive of the adverse party in pursuing cross-examination.
Factors that have been catalogued by the courts include (i)
exact duplication of factual issues; (ii) identical legal theories;
(iii) relative posture of the parties in the prior causes; (iv) pres-
ence or absence of additional parties in the prior action; (v) iden-
tity of counsel for the adverse party in the prior litigation; (vi)
necessity for further depositions of the witnesses in the present
action; and (vii) confusion engendered by the use of the prior
depositions. It should be noted that even in the event the court
permits use of depositions taken in prior actions, the adverse party
retains the right to the further deposition testimony from the wit-
nesses.
Perhaps the problems presented in the use of depositions taken
in earlier lawsuits is now more academic than real because of the
general adoption and use of Multidistrict Consolidation for pre-
trial discovery. " Litigation arising from major air disasters un-
doubtedly played an important part in the promulgation of Multi-
district Consolidation procedures. Certainly, Multidistrict Con-
solidation for pretrial discovery comprehends avoidance of dupli-
cation of discovery efforts. Parties, however, should be cognizant
of the problems involved in using depositions taken from earlier
actions involving common air disasters.
VII. CONCLUSION
Litigation arising from aircraft disasters involve a myriad of
complex and unique problems. The difficulties inherent in pretrial
discovery are directly proportionate to the complexities of establish-
ing the causative factors of the accident. Particularly important in
the discovery process is the technical evaluation undertaken by
various governmental agencies, both independently and in con-
junction with private industry. It is imperative that the attorney
fully understand and maximize his use of the invaluable sources
-h28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970). Section (a) provides: "When civil actions in-
volving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts,
such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings ...."
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of technical information compiled on an aircraft disaster. Unques-
tionably, the imaginative use of the liberalized Rules of Procedure
plays a significant role in the ultimate results of litigation.
